Patient non-attendance can lead to worse health outcomes and longer waiting times.
1
Non-attendance is associated with worse health outcomes for non-attenders (Hamilton, Round, & Sharp, 2002; Karter et al., 2004; Nelson, Maruish, & Axler, 2000; Schectman, Schorling, & Voss, 2008; Sharp & Hamilton, 2001) . Although hospitals can overbook appointments non-attendance is also costly (Bech, 2005) . Overbooking increases uncertainty for patients about their waiting time at clinics when they attend. To the extent that missed appointments are not filled by other patients, non-attendance by a patient increases waiting times for all patients. 2, 3 In 2005, the NHS introduced an electronic booking system-Choose and Book (C&B)-which enabled GPs and patients to book an outpatient appointment online from the GP surgery, or later online or by phone, with a choice of location, date, and 1 Some patients referred by their GP and seen by an outpatient consultant may have subsequent outpatient appointments made by the outpatient consultant. We exclude outpatient appointments cancelled by hospitals from the denominator in computing the patient cancellation rate.
2 NHS England estimate missed outpatient appointments had an average cost of £108 in 2012/2013, implying that missed first GP referral appointments would have cost £80 million. It is unclear whether this allows for overbooking. https://www.england.nhs.uk/2014/03/05/missed-appts. 3 Male gender, age, low socio-economic status, waiting time, and distance have been found to be associated with higher non-attendance rates (Corfield, Schizas, Williams, & Noorani, 2008; Hamilton et al., 2002; Sola-Vera et al., 2008; Hon, Leung, Wong, Ma, & Fok, 2005; Lee, Earnest, Chen, & Krishnan, 2005) . Reminders by telephone, text message, and post reduce non-attendance rates (Gurol-Urganci, de Jongh, Vodopivec-Jamsek, Autun, & Car, 2013; Guy et al., 2012) .
time. The aims of the new system were to reduce non-attendance (NAO, 2005) and to help patients exercise a new right to a wider choice of hospital implemented in 2006 (Department of Health, 2004 .
Previous studies of the impact of C&B on patient non-attendance have been small scale, for particular specialities, and have mixed results. Some (Beckingsale & Wallace, 2009; Modayil, Hornigold, Glore, & Bowdler, 2009 ) find higher rates of nonattendance rates with C&B whereas others (Elloy, Nogueira, & Sama, 2011; Parmar, Large, Madden, & Das, 2009 ) find lower non-attendance rates.
In this paper, we investigate the effect of the C&B system on patient non-attendance. We make a number of contributions. We allow for the possibility that C&B may also have affected the number of referrals from practices, cancellations by patients, and cancellations by hospitals, as well as the probability of a referred patient failing to attend. We use a new panel data set on the use of C&B for all practices in England between 2004 and 2009. We allow for unobserved time-invariant practice factors by using practice fixed effects and for unobserved time-varying factors by instrumenting practice use of C&B with the average C&B rate of neighbouring practices. We allow for the relaxation of restrictions on patient choice of hospital in 2006 and 2008 by including a survey measure of the extent to which patients reported being aware that they had a right to have a choice when referred. Our analysis also contributes to the limited evidence on examined the impact of a national health information technology programme on the effectiveness of healthcare delivery (Bassi & Lau, 2013; Encinosa & Bae, 2011; Lapointe, Mignerat, & Vedelc, 2011). 4 In 2009, C&B was used to make 50% of GP first appointments at hospital outpatient departments. We find that C&B reduced non-attendances and GP referrals while also reducing patient cancellations. We estimate that in the absence of C&B, there would have been 71,160 (8.7%) more non-attended appointments. Practices where more patients reported being aware of their right to a choice of provider had higher referral rates, lower non-attendance, patient cancellation, and hospital cancellation rates.
In the next section, we first briefly describe the booking process with and without C&B and discuss how C&B could have affected referrals, non-attendance, patient cancellations, and hospital cancellations 5 and then present our estimation strategy.
Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 has results, and Section 5 discusses their interpretation.
| METHODS

| C&B and the referral process
Two features of the referral process help to explain why patients who have been referred to a hospital outpatient department fail to attend. First, there is a non-trivial waiting time between referral and appointment dates. 6 The referral decision depends on the benefits and opportunity costs of attending as estimated at the referral date, and patients may subsequently revise their estimates and decide not to attend. 7 Second, the referral decision is made jointly during a consultation between the patient and GP whereas the attendance decision is made by the patient. If the patient's appointment cost being is weighted more heavily in the attendance decision than in the referral decision, this may lead to non-attendance. If the GP does not use C&B, she will write to the hospital outpatient department to request an appointment for the patient. The hospital would then write to the patient with the details of the appointment slot whose timing would be decided by the hospital on receipt of the request letter from the GP. The patient could attempt to change the appointment directly with the hospital by phone or letter but would not be able to do so over the internet. 4 The NHS spent £280 million on the C&B system up to 2012 (Department of Health, 2013) . Norway, Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands have also invested in electronic referral and booking systems and health information technology to facilitate patient referral and support information exchange and wider patient choice of treatment provider (Naserias, Adham, & Janati, 2015) . The U.S. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009 provided $27 billion for incentive payments and investment in health information technology (Blumenthal & Tavenner, 2010) .
5 Appendix C provides a theory model of the process and the impact of C&B. 6 In 2011, 50% of patients waited more than 30 days. (Care Quality Commission. The Survey of Adult Outpatient Services 2011, NHS England, 2011. http:// www.qualitywatch.org.uk/indicator/waiting-times-outpatient-appointments). 7 Even without new information, hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997 ) may lead to non-attendance. For example, suppose that the waiting time for an appointment is t, that the benefit b from attending (better future health) occurs some time s after attending, and that the cost of attending is c. Then the appointment will be booked at date 0 if and only if δ(t + s)b > δ(t)c where δ is the discount factor applied to future benefits and costs. The booked appointment will be attended at date t if and only if δ(s)b > c. With hyperbolic discounting δ(τ) = βe −rτ , where β ∈ (0,1) if τ > 0 and δ(0) = 1, the patient will fail to attend the booked appoint-
When the GP uses C&B, she will register the patient on the C&B system, and either book the appointment during the consultation or leave the choice of hospital for the patient to make later. The patient would be given a C&B booking reference and could make the booking or change it at a later date (on the internet, by telephone, or in the practice).
The effects of C&B are a priori ambiguous. C&B could have increased the information available to patients about alternative outpatient departments, including their waiting times. This could increase or decrease referrals, and if patients with better information are less likely to revise their estimates of benefits and costs, it could reduce the non-attendance rate. With an appointment made via C&B, patients had the opportunity to defer the booking of an appointment until later at home when they could log into the C&B system and make the booking themselves. This may change the nature of the consultation between the GP and patient, leading to a more shared decision-making process with more weight on patient preferences. 8 If patient attendance costs were given more weight under C&B, this could lead to a reduction in referrals, in patient cancellations, and in non-attendance. The ability of patients to more easily cancel appointments could have increased patient cancellations. Booking costs for general practices probably increased with C&B, especially in its early phase when the software was considered cumbersome and unreliable by many GPs. GPs were financially incentivised to use the C&B system. Between April 2006 and March 2008, they were paid 49p per patient on the list if they agreed to use C&B, and a further 49p per referral if at least 50% were made via C&B. After 2008, payments continued in some primary care trusts (PCTs).
9 These incentive payments may not have offset the additional GP costs of using C&B. This may have led, ceteris paribus, to a reduction in the referral rate for practices that perceived a higher cost of using the new system. Some patients would have had lower booking costs, especially those with better internet access, as the system made it possible for them to confirm or change appointments from home, after their GP had registered their provisional booking. Ceteris paribus, this would have lowered the referral threshold, increasing referrals and the non-attendance rate. But some patients may have found it more difficult to access and use the C&B system compared with the previous system in which the GP made the appointment and so faced higher booking costs. C&B is likely to have increased hospital propensity to cancel outpatient appointments. Hospitals had to make immediate offers of outpatient appointment slots when receiving a request via C&B, whereas without C&B, they had longer to plan scheduled appointments upon receipt of the request letter from the GP. This would have reduced flexibility in appointment booking and placed greater demands on planning and managing appointment slots. The introduction of C&B also coincided with other changes to hospital IT systems.
The introduction of C&B was part of a package of measures to develop the new internal market in the NHS. In particular, from January 2006, patients had to be given the choice of at least four providers for elective care, and in April 2008, patients had the right to choose any willing provider . By widening the available choice set, the choice reforms of 2006 and 2008 are likely to have increased referrals, and reduced patient cancellations, and the probability of non-attendance.
| Estimation
We estimate Poisson conditional fixed effects count data models for GP practice patient non-attendance (N it ), patient cancellation (C it ), hospital cancellation (H it ), and practice referrals (R it ). For example, in our baseline model for patient non-attendance, the expected number of patients not attending and failing to cancel in practice i in year t is
N it is the number of first scheduled appointments that were non-attended in practice i (i = 1, 2, 3, ........, 8,449) in year t (t = 2004, 2005, ......, 2009) . A it is the number who were referred and attended so that N it + C it + A it is the exposure term -the population at risk of deciding not to attend without cancelling. The coefficient on ln (N it + C it + A it ) is constrained to be equal to 1.
10 X it is a vector of GP practice covariates; D t ′ is a year indicator for year t′, with 2004 as the omitted year.
S j (j = 1, 2, …, 10) is a regional (Strategic Health Authority) indicator. B it is the number of referrals made via C&B, and B it /R it is the practice C&B utilisation rate. θ i is a time-invariant unobserved GP practice fixed effect, but, as in the linear and logit specifications, there is no incidental parameter problem and maximum likelihood estimates of β are consistent even in short panels (Blundell, Grifith, & Windmeijer, 2002; Cameron & Trivedi, 2015) . We use cluster robust standard errors that are valid even if the Poisson property 8 See O'Connor, Llewellyn-Thomas, and Flood (2004) for a review of evidence on the effect of shared decision processes on choice of treatment. 9 The 152 PCTs received capitated budgets from the Department of Health and are responsible, inter alia, for delivery of primary care services in their area. 10 In models of hospital cancellations exposure is N it + C it + H it + A it and in models of referrals it is the practice list size L it . of equidispersion does not hold (Cameron & Trivedi, 2015) and also allow for within practice autocorrelation (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004) . Models were estimated using Stata 13.2.
| Identification
There are two potential endogeneity problems in identifying the effect of the C&B rate on referral outcomes and the referral rate. The first is that there may be unobserved practice characteristics influencing both C&B rates and referral outcomes or referral rates. For example, practices with historically high non-attendance rates might have felt they had more to gain by referring patients using the C&B system.
The second potential problem is time-varying endogeneity. In particular, there were other policy changes between 2004 and 2009, which might have affected outcomes. A system of prospective pricing for hospital inpatient stays and outpatient appointments, Payment by Results (PbR), was rolled out from 2004/2005 (Department of Health, 2012). There were major changes to the contract between the NHS and general practices in April 2004 (Quality and Outcomes Framework) that incentivised care for particular patient groups and could have influenced referrals for outpatient diagnosis and testing (Gillam, Siriwardena, & Steel, 2012; Roland, 2004) .
Most saliently, from January 2006, all patients had to be offered a choice of at least four local hospitals when making an outpatient appointment, and from April 2008, patients had a right to be referred to any hospital providing services to NHS patients . To help patients make choices, the NHS Choices website was introduced in 2007 to provide information on hospitals.
11 The widening of patients' hospital choice sets is likely to have increased referrals and reduced non-attendance once referred. GPs' use of C&B was probably correlated with their propensity to offer a wider choice of hospital .
12
The use of year by region fixed effects will also control for common time-varying changes in the offer of choice and absorb the effects of policies, which varied by year, either nationally or regionally, as well as allowing for differential trends in unobserved factors influencing outcomes across practices. We also include time-varying GP practice characteristics that may have influenced C&B uptake as well as patient non-attendance. For example, the number of GP practices fell between 2004 and 2009, with a declining proportion of small single-handed practices and an increasing proportion of large multi-GP practices. To control for any possible effect of practice size and staffing, we include both the practice list size and the number of GPs per patient in the model. We also include time-varying indicators of organisational quality of GP practices. We further include the proportion of practice referrals to over 50 specialities in each year to control for policies such as prospective pricing and the new practice contract whose effects could vary by speciality.
We allow for any remaining endogeneity in two ways. First, all specifications condition out practice effects so that we use only the variation in C&B uptake within GP practices over time, thereby removing the effects of time-invariant factors. The identification strategy in our baseline specification (1) is analogous to a difference in differences estimation, but with a continuous level of treatment (C&B uptake) (Gaynor, Moreno-Serra, & Propper, 2013) .
Second, to allow for any time-varying unobserved heterogeneity, we instrument practice use of C&B with the average annual C&B use in the PCT to which the practice belongs. We use two-stage residual inclusion (Terza, Basu, & Rathouz, 2008) adding the residual from the linear first-stage model of C&B to the second-stage Poisson regressions.
Our use of an IV for C&B use will remove any bias in the estimated effects of C&B arising from the omission of correlated factors, such as an increase in choice. But the effect of choice policy is of interest in own right, and so in some specifications, we also include a direct measure of the effect of choice policy: the proportion of patients in the practice's PCT who report that they were aware that they had a right to be offered a choice of hospital when referred.
| Robustness checks
We also undertook robustness checks. We allow the effects of C&B uptake to vary by year, thereby allowing an estimate of its effect in 2005 before the relaxation of constraints on patient choice. We also allow for heterogeneous trends in the outcomes that may be correlated (Ranerup, 2008) . 12 The evaluation of Choice policy by the Kings Fund (Dixon et al., 2010, p. 41) noted that "GPs, in particular, conflated patient choice with Choose and Book, in part because it is through this system of booking that the policy of patient choice is 'enacted'." practice. We investigate the possibility that the effects of C&B might vary depending on the availability of hospitals by estimating models in which we interact the C&B rate with the average distance from the practice to hospitals.
We also used alternative estimation methods: random effects Poisson and population-averaged negative binomial. These specifications allowed for unobserved time-invariant practice factors by including presample (2003) values of the dependent count variable divided by its corresponding exposure term as an explanatory variable (Blundell et al., 2002) .
| Choose and Book
Data on the number of all first GP practice referrals made using the C&B system to all hospital providers treating NHS patients by month of referral, specialty of referral, hospital of treatment, and referring GP practice were obtained from NHS Connecting for Health and the Department of Health's C&B Service Utilisation Database (HSCIC, 2015) . The C&B data cover the period January 1, 2005, to January 1, 2010. The year 2005 was a pilot year with selected GP practices and hospitals participating. From January 1, 2006, C&B was launched nationally and available to all GP practices, but the system was not initially in place across all hospitals and specialties. Over time, the system was rolled out to most hospital departments and use of C&B by GP practices increased, so that by 2009, 50% of first GP outpatient appointments were booked with C&B (see Table 1 and Figure 1 ). 13 Fixed effects negative binomial models suffer from the incidental parameter problem or require implausibly strong assumptions (Cameron & Trivedi, 2015) . We use year by region effects in the empirical analysis, and this will allow for under recording of referrals made at the end of 2009. We use the HES data to derive total annual first referrals made during each of the calendar years 2004 to 2009 for all English general practices, which had at least 500 registered patients during the year. We dropped 110 (0.20%) practice-year observations with a record of C&B utilisation but with no referrals recorded in HES. There were also 2,316 (4.13%) practice-year observations where the total recorded C&B first referrals exceeded first referrals recorded in HES. N it number of appointments recorded as not attended with no prior warning; C it number of first scheduled GP referred appointments cancelled by patients; H it number of first scheduled GP practice referred appointments cancelled by the hospital; A it number of first scheduled GP practice referred appointments attended.
In some hospitals, the only referral outcomes recorded were that the patient attended or that the outcome was unknown: The hospital recorded no referrals in which the patient failed to attend, or the patient cancelled, or the hospital cancelled. In 2004, 8.7% of appointments were in 29 providers that did not record outcomes other than attended or unknown. This misrecording decreased year on year, until in 2009, 1.9% of appointments were at 15 hospitals that only reported attendance or unknown outcomes. When computing practice referral outcomes, we exclude referrals to these hospitals from the denominator of the practice non-attendance, patient cancellation, and hospital cancellation rates.
14 The error is due to (a) a failure in HES to record GP practice codes (ranging between 3% and 5% of records for referred patients in each year, but concentrated in a small subset of GP practices) and (2) inaccurate date of referral. 15 About 0.45% of appointments in hospitals recording the full range of outcomes had an unknown outcome; 0.37% of appointment records did not distinguish whether the appointment was a first or follow-up appointment. We assumed that they were first appointment if the organisation referral code (reforg) in HES matched a valid GP practice code, and included them in the four outcome categories. 
| Practice covariates
We include a large set of time-varying practice characteristics in the models (see the summary statistics in Table A1 ). These include the number of patients on the practice list, the proportion of patients in 14 age by gender groups, the number of whole-time equivalent GPs per patient, the mean age of GPs, the proportion of GPs who are not GP principals, the proportion who qualified in the U.K., and the proportion of female GPs. We attribute socio-economic characteristics in small areas (Lower Super Output Areas) 16 to practices using the proportion of practice patients resident in each Lower Super Output Areas. From the Quality and Outcomes Framework, we have data on practice disease prevalence of 11 conditions and on smoking prevalence and 14 measures of practice organisational quality. To allow for differences in the participation of different hospital specialities in C&B, we also include the proportions of each practice's first referrals to 53 specialities. We also measure the mean straight line distances from each GP practice to all NHS and independent sector hospitals.
| Patient choice
Following the introduction of patient choice in England, the Department of Health commissioned IPSOS/MORI to undertake a quarterly survey of randomly selected first referral patients in each PCTs (Dixon, 2010) . We use responses to a question about whether patients were aware that they had a right to a choice of hospital. 17 We aggregated quarterly response rates to calendar years to coincide with our time periods for C&B utilisation. 
| Estimation sample
We were able to match 49,987 practice-years between 2004 and 2009 to 97.8% of HES records for first GP referrals. Excluding practices with populations less than 500 resulted in a loss of 361 (0.72%) observations, and a further 586 practice-years (1.2%) were lost where first referrals recorded in the C&B system exceeded first referrals recorded in HES or where all referrals were to hospitals that did not record non-attendance. We also excluded outlier practices with referral rates of over 50%, annual changes in referral rates of more than 100%, or registered population changes of greater than 25% compared to the subsequent year. In total, we excluded 2,531 (5.1%) practice-year observations. Table 1 shows that under 1% of GP practice referrals were booked using C&B during the pilot year 2005. This increased to 20% in the first year of the national system in 2006, and by 2009, 50% of GP practice first referrals were booked using C&B. There was wide dispersion in utilisation of C&B across practices in 2009 (Figure 1) .with a near normal distribution apart from the lower tail with a concentration of practices with usage rates below 20% and with 5% of practices with rates of utilisation at or near zero. In 2006, the proportion of patients reporting being aware of their right to a choice was higher (34%) than the proportion of referrals made using C&B (19%). Both increased over time, and in 2009, the proportion aware of their right to a choice was 48% and the C&B rate was 49%. At PCT, level awareness and the C&B rate were positively and quite highly correlated, with correlations between 0.48 in 2007 and 0.32 in 2009. 18 Figure 2 shows the frequency distribution of patient non-attendance rates across practices for 2009. It is heavily skewed to the right, and over 85% of practices had non-attendance rates below 10%. 16 There were 32,482 LSOAs with a minimum population of 1000 and a mean population of 1500. 17 The question was "Q1. Before you visited your GP, did you know that you now have a choice of hospitals that you can go to for your first hospital (Imison & Naylor, 2010) . There was a rapid rise in the number of consultant to consultant referrals after 2005 as the PbR system was rolled out, probably because hospitals now had a financial incentive to record them. Some PCTs, which bore the cost of additional referrals, reacted by requiring that the referral had to be routed via the patient's GP. The introduction of 18-week waiting time targets in 2008 measured from date of referral to admission may also have increased referrals. Table 2 presents results from the conditional fixed effects Poisson model (1). The reported coefficients are the estimated proportionate change in the outcomes from a one-unit (i.e., 1%) increase in the C&B rate. Because the national average C&B rate increased from zero in 2004 to nearly 50% in 2009, we also report the percentage change in the outcome rates from a 50% increase in the C&B rate: Δ% 50 C&B = 100[exp(
| RESULTS
| Descriptive statistics
| Estimated effects of C&B and patient choice policies
An increase in use of C&B is associated with a decrease in patient non-attendance at first scheduled outpatient appointment. A 50 percentage point increase in C&B utilisation is associated with a −10.9%, 95% CI [−9.8%, −12.0%], proportionate reduction in the rate of non-attendance. Increased use of C&B is also associated with a reduction in the practice referral rate, though the proportionate reduction (−3%) with a 50% increase in the C&B rate is smaller than for non-attendance. Patient cancellations were also reduced when the practice C&B uptake was increased. Finally, hospital cancellations were much higher when the practice C&B rate is higher: A 50% increase in the C&B rate is associated with a 40% proportionate increase in the hospital cancellation rate.
19 19 In additional robustness checks, we found that results are qualitatively robust across the estimation methods (see Table B1 , Supplementary Material Appendix). The Poisson random effects model, which includes the prior year 2003 outcome as an explanatory, is closest to our baseline conditional Poisson fixed effects model reported in Table 2 , with very similar coefficients and smaller standard errors. The population-averaged negative binomial has larger effects except for hospital cancellations where the effect is negative, though small and insignificant, rather than positive as with the other estimators. The Poisson random effects and negative binomial population-averaged models also show that the variance exceeds the mean so that it is necessary to allow for over dispersion in computing the standard errors. We do so by using robust standard errors clustered on practices. Table 3 has the results from a specification in which the effect of C&B varies across years. The marginal proportional effect on non-attendance in participating practices is largest in 2005 (prior to introduction of the patient choice policy) but less precisely estimated than in subsequent years, probably because of the smaller number (2,228) of practices using C&B in this pilot year.
The changes in the coefficient on the C&B rate over time do not suggest that the changes in choice policy in 2006 and 2008, which widened choice sets changed the effect of C&B uptake. The proportional reduction in the GP referral rate due to C&B for participating practices declined over time, suggesting that the expansion of patient choice may have increased referrals, but nationally, this was more than offset by increasing use of C&B, so that by 2009, we estimate that C&B reduced referral rates by −1.4%, 95% CI [-2.5%, −0.4%].
20 The effects of C&B on patient cancellations varied across the years, being positive in some years and negative in others. The effect of C&B on hospital cancellations was always positive, but its magnitude declined sharply over time, suggesting that initially, hospitals found it more difficult to handle referrals made by the C&B system. 21 Table 4 tests the robustness of our results to different underlying practice trends in their propensities to use C&B. We add an interaction between year dummies and mean practice C&B utilisation over the period 2005 to 2009. Our results are qualitatively unchanged with C&B associated with reductions in non-attendance and referrals. The magnitude of the effects are slightly less negative, and in some years, there was evidence that a greater propensity to use C&B on average was associated with Table 2 models. Coefficients are the proportionate change in the dependent variable from a one-unit change in the explanatory. Robust standard errors in square brackets allow for clustering within GP practices. C&B = Choose and Book; GP = general practitioner. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 20 We compute the effect of C&B in year t as 100[exp(β 1t 100[exp(β 1t (B t /R t )) − 1] where β 1t is the coefficient on the year t C&B rate and B t /R t is the average referral rate. 21 We also allowed the effect of C&B to vary across the 10 SHA regions. Results are reported in Table B3 in the online appendix. The estimated effects of C&B on non-attendance were negative across all 10 regions, but not statistically significant in the South West, which had the largest uptake of C&B. The West Midlands and South Central regions experienced the largest relative reductions in non-attendance of −18.6% and −15.5%, respectively. There were more varied impacts on referral rates across the SHAs. There was a significant (at 5%) negative effect only in six of the 10 SHAs. There were also mixed effects on patient cancellations across the SHAs: Patient cancellations increased significantly as a result of C&B in two of the SHAs and decreased significantly in three of them.
Hospital cancellations increased in all SHAs. significantly higher underlying trends in non-attendance and referrals. Patient cancellations were negatively associated with C&B utilisation, but no longer statistically significant at 5%, and hospital cancellations remained positive and statistically significantly associated with C&B uptake.
22
We examined whether the effects of C&B were affected by the average distance from the practice to all possible referral hospitals. Average distance to hospital is a proxy for the cost of travel and the extent of effective choice for patients. Table 5 reports results from a model with C&B uptake interacted with indicators for the quintiles of average distance. The effects of C&B on non-attendance, patient cancellations, and hospital cancellations did not differ by distance to hospitals. For referrals, the effect of distance on the effect of C&B is mixed, but generally, the negative effect of C&B is smaller at higher distance quintiles.
In Table 6 , we examine the implications of potential endogeneity of C&B, instrumenting practice use of C&B with the mean C&B uptake in the PCT. We also allow directly for choice policy in some specifications by adding a measure of the extent to which patients were aware of their right to a choice of hospital. In panel a, we repeat the results from the baseline specification in Table 2 with uninstrumented C&B and with no measure of choice policy. Panel b has the results when add the residuals from the first-stage C&B model to second-stage model. The estimated effect of C&B on non-attendance and on hospital cancellations is similar to those in the uninstrumented model in panel a, and the first-stage residual is statistically insignificant, suggesting that C&B was not endogenous for these outcomes. C&B is endogenous for referrals and for patient cancellations, and the negative effect of C&B is 3 to 4 times larger than in the uninstrumented model in panel a.
22 Table B2 . All models also contain year and SHA interactions, total practice list size, proportion of list in 13 age/gender groups, patients per whole time equivalent GP, average GP age, proportion female GPs, proportion GPs qualified in the U.K., proportion of nonprincipal GPs, 15 QOF practice quality indicators, disease prevalence and patient deprivation, and proportion of referrals to 53 separate specialities. Same number of observations as in Table 2 models. Coefficients are the proportionate change in the dependent variable from a one-unit change in the explanatory. Robust standard errors in square brackets allow for clustering within GP practices. C&B = Choose and Book; GP = general practitioner.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. . All models also contain year and SHA interactions, total practice list size, proportion of list in 13 age/gender groups, patients per whole time equivalent GP, average GP age, proportion female GPs, proportion GPs qualified in the U.K., proportion of nonprincipal GPs, 15 QOF practice quality indicators, disease prevalence and patient deprivation, and proportion of referrals to 53 separate specialities. Same number of observations as in Table 2 models. Coefficients are the proportionate change in the dependent variable from a one-unit change in the explanatory. Robust standard errors in square brackets allow for clustering within GP practices. C&B = Choose and Book; GP = general practitioner.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
In panels c and d, we add a measure of awareness of choice to the uninstrumented and instrumented models in panels a and b. The C&B residual is again statistically insignificant in the non-attendance and hospital cancellation models in panel d implying that the appropriate model for these outcomes measure is the uninstrumented model in panel c. Comparing panels c and a, we see that the inclusion of the choice awareness measure does not change the effect of C&B. Panel c suggests that greater awareness of choice reduced non-attendance and hospital cancellations.
The C&B residual is statistically significant for referrals and patient cancellation in panel d. Increases in C&B reduce referrals and patient cancellations (as in the model without the choice measure in panel b). Increases in awareness of choice increase referrals and reduce patient cancellations, presumably because with greater choice, the expected net benefit from a referral is increased.
When corrected for endogeneity the negative C&B effect on referrals becomes several times larger. This may be due to the correlation induced from having the number of referrals as the denominator for the practice C&B utilisation rate, which would reduce the estimated magnitude of the C&B coefficient if we do not control for endogeneity. (Table 3) .with time-varying effects of C&B. The red line plots the percentage difference between the average nonattendance rate in year t and the average non-attendance rate in 2004 before the introduction of C&B. The black dashed line plots the equivalent counterfactual difference with a zero C&B rate in all years. By 2007, the reduction in the national non-attendance rate due to C&B was over 7% and this had increased to over 12% by 2009. Figure 4 shows the national impacts of the introduction of C&B and choice policy on GP referrals, independently of each other from 2005 to 2009. The graph used estimated coefficients from the two-stage residual inclusion IV model in Table 6 panel d, which allows for the effect of the patient awareness of choice policy and endogeneity of C&B. The solid red line plots the percentage difference between the average referral rate in year t relative to the baseline year 2004 due to the uptake of C&B, assuming that the associated patient choice policy had not been implemented (i.e., awareness of choice remained zero from 2006 onwards); the dotted brown line shows the percentage change in referrals attributed to the effect of the introduction of the patient choice policy in 2006, assuming that C&B had not been implemented; and the black dashed line plots the equivalent counterfactual that had C&B and patient choice not been introduced, that is, a zero C&B and choice awareness in all years. By 2007, the reduction in national referrals due to the uptake of C&B was nearly −7.6%. This reduction was offset by a 6% referral increase due to an increased awareness of choice of hospital. By 2009, with an uptake of C&B and awareness of choice of around 50%, C&B had decreased referrals by 11.4% whereas choice policy had increased referrals by 7.7%. 23 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. We also followed another suggestion to use the 1-year lag of C&B utilisation as an instrument in the patient referral model. The results using the lag C&B rate as well as the PCT mean rate were nearly identical. The lag C&B rate was quite a strong IV (F-stat = 33.99), but weaker than the PCT mean. The estimated effect of C&B was −0.00194 and of choice awareness was 0.0011. An overidentification test for the validity of the lag C&B rate could not reject the null hypothesis that the use of C&B in the previous period affected patient referrals in the next period, assuming that the PCT mean rate to be a valid instrument. 
| DISCUSSION
The electronic C&B system for general practice referrals to hospital outpatient departments was introduced in 2005. We investigated its effects using models with practice fixed effects, year by region effects, and a large set of time-varying covariates, including practice and patient characteristics and the mix of outpatient specialities, for over 7,700 English practices from 2004 to 2009. We find that practices that increased their use of the C&B system had a reduction in the proportion of referred patients failing to attend. They also reduced their referral rates. The results are qualitatively robust to alternative specifications, which allowed for differential trends for practices with a higher propensity to utilise C&B and for endogeneity from unobserved year-specific GP practice shocks affecting C&B utilisation and non-attendance. There was evidence of significant C&B endogeneity bias for referrals, probably induced by referrals being the denominator of the C&B rate. Using the PCT mean C&B rate as an instrument, we find that increased use of C&B reduced referrals. We also included a time and PCT-varying patient choice policy variable, which enables us to separate out the contribution of the effects of the increased patient awareness of their right to be offered a choice of hospital from use of C&B. We find that patient awareness of choice reduced patient non-attendance but did not change the effect of C&B. This suggests that the electronic booking system's facility to schedule more convenient appointments, to actively involve patients in the referral decision, location, and timing, and the reduction in referral thresholds were as or more important than awareness of choice in reducing non-attendances. By contrast, a greater awareness of choice leads to a significant increase in referrals, suggesting that patients were offered larger choice sets and so could choose providers better suited to them.
An increase in use of C&B and, to a greater extent, an increase in awareness of choice were both associated with fewer patient cancellations, perhaps because they enabled patients to make a better initial choice of hospital. C&B increased hospital cancellations whereas patient choice awareness reduced them. This is consistent with hospital administrators finding appointment scheduling harder when an increasing proportion of appointments were made further in advance via the C&B system.
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Hospitals operating in areas with greater choice awareness would face competitive pressures to attract patients and hence improve appointment scheduling.
The estimated magnitudes of the C&B effects on non-attendance are similar to the effects of other policies designed to reduce patient non-attendance. A meta-analysis of randomised controlled trials of Short Messaging Service text message reminders in the days prior to scheduled first appointments found an estimated improvement in the odds ratio of attending of 1.48 (Guy et al., 2012) . Given the 2009 attendance rate of 87.6%, this implies an increase in the attendance rate of 4.45 percentage points to 92.05%. The non-attendance and cancellation rates in 2009 were 7% and 5.4%, respectively. From Table 6 , panel d, a 50% increase in C&B utilisation was associated with a −8.92% decrease in non-attendance to 6.38%, and a −8.38% reduction in cancellations to 4.95%, which is equivalent to a 1.07 percentage point increase in the attendance rate. This is smaller than the effect found for Short Messaging Service interventions in a randomised controlled trial setting, where compliance with the intervention was likely to be close to 100% (C&B with 100% compliance would increase attendance by 2.06 percentage points).
We do not have the data to attempt a cost-benefit analysis of C&B, but the magnitudes of the estimated effects of the introduction of C&B are likely to be economically significant. Patients failed to attend 7% or 832,263 of the 11,870,043 first referrals recorded in 2009. C&B was used to make 50% of the appointments in this year, and we estimate that in the absence of C&B, there would have been 72,160 (8.7%) more non-attended appointments and 1,081,747 (9.11%) fewer referrals, independently of the introduction of patient choice. The introduction of the patient choice policy was associated with an increase in referrals of 752,093 assuming that the policy was responsible for a 50% increase in awareness of choice of provider to patients in 2009. About 30% of first GP referrals do not result in hospital admissions, tests, or onward referral to another consultant. This suggests that some of the referrals not made as a result of C&B may have been medically unnecessary, especially as these marginal referrals would have been those perceived by the patient and GP to be of low net benefit. The increase in hospital cancellations would have increased the administrative costs. Over 90% of hospital cancelled appointments are rescheduled so that hospital cancellations are less likely to result in patients not being seen, but patients could be delayed as a result or their appointment cancellations or could have made unnecessary visits to the hospital.
Our results demonstrate that there was a marked change in referral rates and in the rates of patient non-attendance once referred associated with changes in use of C&B within practices over time. We also find effects of choice policy on nonattendance, patient cancellations, hospital cancellations, and referrals. Changes the decision-making process over referrals and attendance have an economically important effects on attendance and referrals. Given the concern about welfare loss from non-attended appointments and recent proposals to introduce patient charges for missed appointments (Watt, 2015) , our study 24 An increase in scheduling errors and reappointment was noted in the implementation of the electronic booking system supporting the Norwegian "FreeChoice-Of-Hospital" policy introduced in 2001 (Lotherington & Obstfelder, 2006) . suggests that there is scope for further reducing non-attendance and hospital referrals by expanding the use of electronic booking systems and facilitating patient choice in referral decisions to improve the appropriateness of referrals. Widening provider choice reinforced the reductions in patient non-attendance and cancellations, whereas increasing referrals suggesting choice improved access to specialist care.
